Basic Jurisdictional Principles
A Theological Inventory of American Jurisprudence
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  Article I § 8 clause 2  
 
 
"In 1655, two years before [William Bradford] died, . . .  he came to the letter that Pastor John Robinson and Elder William Brewster had written from Leyden to Edwin Sandys in London. The letter brimmed with the confidence . . .  because of the proven strength of their covenant relationship. Indeed, they were ‘knit together as a body in a most strict and sacred bond and covenant of the Lord . . . .’ Reading that, Bradford . . .  poured out his heart on the back of that particular page in his manuscript: ‘O sacred bond, whilst inviolably preserved, how sweet and precious were the fruits that flowed from the same! But when this fidelity decayed, then their ruin approached. O that these ancient members had not died or been dissipated . . .  or else that this holy care and constant faithfulness had still lived and remained with those that survived! . . . .’ No one, not even Bradford, was denying that the settlement of the wilderness to the west was part of God’s plan. But that was the ministers’ whole point: it should be carried out as part of His plan, in accordance with His perfect will and timing. It should not be done willy-nilly, by isolated individualists, who could not care less about being in God’s will . . . . Heedless of the covenants they had sworn, . . .  they simply departed." 1
 
 

Article I § 8 clause 2:

The Congress shall have Power . . .  To borrow money on the credit of the United States;

If Congress has a power and authority to tax that lies on a moral foundation that supersedes consent – as we claim it has 2 – and such lawful taxation can exist to pay debts of the general government – as we claim it can 3 – then it’s reasonable that Congress has a lawful "Power . . .  To borrow money" to support the general government. From the perspective of the global covenant, we find nothing objectionable about this allocation of power to Congress. Congress might borrow money for either jural purposes or ecclesiastical purposes. As an agent of the entire social compact, Congress might need to borrow money for either of these disparate sets of purposes. Borrowing for either of these purposes appears legitimate, as long as the approach to taxation to pay for such debts meshes with the purpose of the debt. In other words, if the debt is ecclesiastical, then the method of taxation should be ecclesiastical, as indicated above. 4 And if the debt is jural, then the taxes to pay the debt can be applied to everyone within the geographical jurisdiction, just like any other jural tax. — What if the debt is to pay for a program that the Congress has set up, in which citizens voluntarily contract with Congress through some agency of the general government? For example, suppose Social Security is voluntary. And suppose Congress needs to borrow money to support the Social Security Administration. Is this a legitimate reason for Congress to borrow money?

We’re bound to answer "No!", and here’s why: Assuming that the jural society attempts to implement a form of due process that eschews vigilante committees, and makes them unnecessary, the jural society is in effect attempting to monopolize the legitimate use of force within its geographical jurisdiction. It cannot deprive a human being of his/her right to defend his/her property, and it should never attempt to do so. But it should definitely attempt to make vigilante committees unnecessary by being proficient at rendering justice in all cases of bloodshed – not by making vigilante committees inherently illegal. Given that the jural society attempts to monopolize the legitimate use of force by making self-defense and vigilante committees unnecessary, the jural society becomes an inherently ominous, foreboding, and intimidating presence within the society at large. Given that it has this kind of strength, it is inherently incapable of entering into a contract with a private citizen as though it had a status equal or comparable to that private citizen. In other words, it has such a huge capacity to abuse its power and authority that every contract that it makes with every private citizen needs to be heralded with a warning:

Warning! You are now entering a contract with a monolithic entity that has the capacity to ruin your life without even noticing that you exist. You are entering this contract at your own risk.

If a private citizen contracts with the Defense Department to manufacture munitions, then such citizen should know going in that he might be ruined. But most defense contractors are willing to take the risk. But this is not the same with regard to Social Security. Most people don’t even know that Social Security is a contract into which they can refuse to enter. As a matter of fact, the Social Security Administration claims that Social Security is not a contract. 5 If it’s not a contract, then consent is not part of the program. The only alternatives to consent are force and fraud. 6 So Social Security is either consensual and contractual, or it is an act of bloodshed perpetrated by the government against its people. This is precisely the kind of abuse of power and authority that results almost inevitably from giving the jural society unlimited freedom to contract with its individual citizens. — Some people might claim that the Social Security system is not part of the jural society, but of the ecclesiastical society, precisely because it is contractual. Such people might claim that all these arguments – regarding this monopolization of the legitimate use of force – are bogus because the ecclesiastical society doesn’t have such power and authority.

The social compact defines the umbrella organization that governs both the jural impetus and the ecclesiastical impetus. If the jural society has this kind of power and authority, then so does the social compact, and through the social compact, so does the ecclesiastical society. This is precisely why the ecclesiastical society should be limited to adjudication and enforcement of contracts, and the officers of the ecclesiastical society should not be allowed to randomly engage – in their official capacity – in being parties to contracts with private citizens. Definite restraints need to be placed on such contracts, for the sake of ensuring that the government is not a perpetrator of bloodshed.

With these qualifications well in mind, we see nothing objectionable about Congress’s "Power . . .  To borrow money on the credit of the United States". The inevitable message to all such creditors is

Creditor Beware! You are now entering a contract with a monolithic entity that has the capacity to ruin your life without even noticing that you exist. You are entering this contract at your own risk.

The potential for abuse is huge. This clause has, indeed, been hugely abused. 7 Since debts are merely a form of contract, everything that’s said here about the general government’s potential for abusing contracts applies to the general government’s potential for abusing debtor-creditor agreements, regardless of whether such government is in the role of debtor or creditor.

Footnotes

1The Light and the Glory, pp. 218-219. The two nested quotes are from Edward Johnson, The Wonder-Working Providences of Sion’s Saviour in New England, J. Franklin Jameson, editor (pub. 1653), Barnes and Noble edition, 1910, p. 253.

2See Article I § 8 cl 1, URL: ./0_2_1_0_Art_I_Sec_8_Cl_1.htm​#UnalienablePowerToTax.

3See Article I § 8 cl 1, URL: ./0_2_1_0_Art_I_Sec_8_Cl_1.htm​#UnalienablePowerToTax.

4See Article I § 8 cl 1, URL: ./0_2_1_0_Art_I_Sec_8_Cl_1.htm​#UnalienablePowerToTax.

5The supreme Court reinforces this opinion. In United States v. Lee 455 U.S. 252 (1982), some Amish people asked the government to be exempted from paying into Social Security. The supreme Court in essence told the Amish that they would not be exempted. Essentially, these Amish people are thereby being forced to contract. This, in essence, it not really a contract, but bloodshed perpetrated by big government.

6Consent is a prerequisite for the existence of any contract. If anyone enters any Social Security, or any other financial arrangement, involuntarily, then they are by definition a victim of force and/or fraud. See Article III § 2 cl 1, URL: ./0_4_1_0_0_Art_III_Sec_2_Cl_1_(Intro).htm, for more about this, especially with regard to unjust enrichment.

7For more about this, see The Creature from Jekyll Island, pp. 309-324, Chapter 15, "The Lost Treasure Map".

 
 
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